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NOTE
REAL CITIES, IDEAL CITIES: PROPOSING A TEST OF
INTRINSIC FAIRNESS FOR CONTESTED
DEVELOPMENT EXACTIONSt
D.S. Pensleytt
"From now on, I'll describe the cities to you," the Khan had said, "in
your journeys you will see ifthey exist."
But the cities visited by Marco Polo were always different from those
thought of by the emperor.
"And yet I have constructed in my mind a model city from which all
possible cities can be deduced," Kublai said. "It contains everything corresponding to the norm. Since the cities that exist diverge in varying degree
from the norm, I need only foresee the exceptions to the norm and calculate
the most probable combinations."
"I have also thought of a model city from which I deduce all the others,"
Marco answered. "Itis a city made only of exceptions, exclusions, incongruities, contradictions. If such a city is the most improbable, by reducing the
number of abnormalelements, we increase the probability that the city really
exists. So I have only to subtract exceptionsfrom my model, and in whatever
direction I proceed, I will arrive at one of the cities which, always as an
exception, exist. But I cannot force my operation beyond a certain limit: I
would achieve cities too probable to be real."

-Italo Calvino 1
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INTRODUCTION

Across the country, local government control over land develop-

ment has shifted focus from the naive concerns of the 1920s with laying out streets and separating uses2 to the current performance-based
goals of reallocating fiscal burdens, optimizing revenue, and minimizing public costsA Against this backdrop, exactions comprise all the
conditions that municipalities-driven by need or greed-might impose on permit applicants before approving development projects
ranging from construction of a residential subdivision to rehabilita4
tion of a single commercial structure.

Exactionary permit conditions may include: land or easement
dedications for schools, parks, or trails; impact fees to defray the cost
of increased traffic or facility usage; purchase or donation of equipment or off-site parcels for public use; and linkage fees to finance af5
fordable housing for the employees of incoming commercial tenants.
Municipalities now justify development exactions through tenuous
2 See, e.g., NEWMAN F. BAKER, LEGAL ASPECTS OF ZONING 34 (1927) (emphasizing the
need to ameliorate congestion, which causes vice and crime, disease and traffic accidents);
see also Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387, 389-90 (1926) (upholding
the validity of zoning); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 107 (1909) (upholding the validity of
building height restrictions).
3
See RUTHERFORD H. PLATr, LAND USE AND SOCIETY- GEOGRAPHY, LAW, AND PUBLIC
POLICY 277-78 (rev. ed. 2004).
4 See generally WILLIAM C. JOHNSON, URBAN PLANNING AND POLITICS 89-90 (1997) (explaining how general-purpose local governments combine revenue from property taxes,
federal and state aid, improvement assessments, and development exactions); YI-Fu TUAN,
TOPOPHILIA: A STUDY OF ENVIRONMENTAL PERCEPTION, ATrITUDES, AND VALUES 151 (Morningside Ed. 1990) (1974) ("The essential requirement [for urbanization] is the existence
of a central bureaucracy that has the power to command food and services from the people
of the countryside."); Elizabeth D. Purdum & James E. Frank, Community Use of Exactions:
Results of a National Survey, in DEVELOPMENT EXACTIONS 123, 124, 126 (James E. Frank &
Robert M. Rhodes eds., 1987) (reporting the results of a 1984 study that found eighty-eight
percent of American municipalities required land dedication for primarily on-site infrastructure: roads, water and sewer lines, and drainage).
5 See JOHN M. LEVY, CONTEMPORARY URBAN PLANNING 135 (6th ed. 2003); James A.
Kushner, Property and Mysticism: The Legality of Exactions as a Conditionfor PublicDevelopment
Approval in the Time of the Rehnquist Court, 8J. LAND USE & ENVrL. L. 53, 79-144 (1992).
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connections to remote effects occurring distantly from the development site. 6 These justifications lie far from "the explicit purpose of
local land use control: to ensure efficient, equitable, and balanced use
7
of available land in the community."
When contesting permit conditions, subdividers and other developers frequently claim an uncompensated taking of property under
the Fifth Amendment8 or under a comparable state constitutional
provision. 9 Currentjurisprudence provides little practical guidance to
either municipal planning staff or the development community-and
their respective attorneys-in determining the prospective validity of a
permit condition. 10 Through a one-set-of-standards-fits-all approach,
this case law disregards the influence that the particularity of place
has on the democratic process.
To address the constitutionality of contested development exactions, in Dolan v. City of Tigard a sharply divided Supreme Court established more than ten years ago a standard of "rough proportionality"
between the nature and extent of the permit condition and the impact of the proposed development." Put differently, while "[n]o precise mathematical calculation is necessary to show the required
reasonable relationship ....
an agency [or municipality] must make
some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is... roughly proportional." 12 In Nollan v. California Coastal Com6 See generally ALAN A. ALTSHULER & Jos# A. G6MEZ-IBAN EZ, REGULATION FOR REVENUE:
THE POLrrICAL ECONOMY OF LAND USE EXACTIONS 16, 42-46 (1993) (describing exactions
predicated upon the supposed connection between a development and its negative socioeconomic effects).
7 PLATr, supra note 3, at 278; see, e.g., St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 861
So. 2d 1267, 1272 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (Pleus, J., concurring) (characterizing alternate permit conditions, which required either replacing culverts 4.5 miles away from the
proposed development site or plugging drainage canals seven miles away, as extortionate).
8 See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235 (1897)
(incorporating the Takings Clause through the Fourteenth Amendment).
9 See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 18 ("Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation."). The court then determines whether the
state action constitutes an uncompensated takings under state law. See, e.g., R & Y, Inc. v.
Municipality of Anchorage, 34 P.3d 289, 293 (Alaska 2001).
10 See infra Part 1.
I1 See 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994). Tigard, Oregon attempted to exact from an elderly
widow and hardware store proprietor a dedication of roughly ten percent of her commercial parcel to combat flooding from the adjacent Fanno Creek and to extend a bikeway
towards Main Street. See id. at 380; see alsoJOHNSON, supra note 4, at 8 (providing a map
that locates A-Boy Electric and Plumbing Supply, the bike path, the hundred-year floodplain, and downtown Tigard); William Funk, Reading Dolan v. City of Tigard, 25 ENVrL. L.
127, 127-29 (1995) (telling the two stories of Dolan: that of the landowner and that of the
city); James L. Huffman, Dolan v. City of Tigard: Another Step in the Right Direction, 25 ENVrL.
L. 143, 145-46 ("The Dolan case illustrates that some governments are now even disinclined to compensate where tradition would have called for exercise of the eminent domain power.").
12 Daniel J. Curtin, Jr. & W. Andrew Gowder, Jr., Recent Developments in Land Use, Planning and Zoning Law Relating to Exactions, 36 URB. LAw. 519, 520 (2004); see, e.g., Ehrlich v.
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mission, decided seven years prior to Dolan, the Court had established
the requirement of an "essential nexus" between the ends furthered
by a permit condition and the official reason for the exaction. 13 Thus,
essential nexus and rough proportionality have become the dual
hallmarks of the Nollan/Dolan doctrine.
In 1995, the Supreme Court missed an opportunity to clarify the
doctrine when it denied certiorari in Parking Ass'n of Georgia, Inc. v.
City ofAtlanta.1 4 After reviewing an ordinance that called for landowners to install curbs, trees, and other landscaping in surface parking
lots of over three hundred spaces, the Georgia Supreme Court determined that Dolan bore no relevance to the situation-and, moreover,
that no taking had occurred-because the ordinance applied to many

City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 433 (Cal. 1996) (remanding to afford the municipality a
postexaction opportunity to justify its permit condition under the rough proportionality
standard); Lincoln City Chamber of Commerce v. City of Lincoln City, 991 P.2d 1080, 1081
(Or. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that a zoning ordinance, which required the applicant's qualified engineer to submit a "rough proportionality report," neither eliminated nor diminished the city's ultimate responsibility to demonstrate rough proportionality); see also
Robert F. Brown, Litigating the Subdivision Exactions Case: The True Meaning of Proportionality,
(June 2001),
http://www.bhlaw.net/CM/Articles%20Presentations/articles%20presentations29.asp ("The ability to demonstrate rough proportionality will turn,
in great part, on the nature of the exaction being analyzed .... [W]here a dedication is
required solely to meet the needs of the residents of a proposed subdivision [such as
streets, sewers, sidewalks, and-arguably-stub roads], the dedication is, by its very nature,
roughly proportional to the impact of the proposed development.").
13
483 U.S. 825, 836-37 (1987); see also Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 20
(1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Traditional land-use regulation . . .does not violate [the Fifth Amendment] because there is a cause-and-effect relationship between the property use restricted by the regulation and the social evil that the
regulation seeks to remedy."). The California Coastal Commission conditioned replacement of a dilapidated bungalow on its owners' dedication of a public easement across their
beachfront lot. See 483 U.S. at 827-28. See generally Timothy A. Bittle, Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission: You Can't Always Get What You Want, But Sometimes You Get What You
Need, 15 PEPP. L. REV. 345 (1988) (recounting the largely forgotten background of Nollan,
authored by co-counsel to the Nollans).
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), laid the foundation for the Nollan/Dolan
doctrine by establishing a two-prong test to determine whether a taking has occurred: if
the ordinance (1) "does not substantially advance legitimate state interests," or (2) "denies
an owner economically viable use of his [or her] land." See id.at 260. Although Nollan
applied a more focused form of the first prong of this test to development exactions, it did
not clarify the degree of connection required between the exaction and the projected
impact of the proposed development. See Mark W. Cordes, Legal Limits on Development Exactions: Responding to Nollan and Dolan, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 513, 527 (1995) ("Because
Nollan involved the unusual scenario where there is no connection between an exaction
and development impact, the full import of the 'essential nexus' standard was left undeveloped."). In Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. __, 125 S.Ct. 2074 (2005), the Supreme
Court renounced the "substantially advances" formula of Agins as unhelpful in comparison
with the more pertinent inquiry into the magnitude or distribution of a regulatory burden.
See 125 S. Ct. at 2084. A unanimous Court, however, explicitly upheld the precedential
value of Nollan and Dolan. See id. at 2087.
14
515 U.S. 1116 (1995).

2006]

REAL CITIES, IDEAL CITIES

703

landowners equally and "simply limited" the use of the property. 15
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice O'Connor, dissented from the denial of certiorari, arguing that rough proportionality should apply regardless whether the exactions were imposed in a sweeping and
legislative fashion or on a particularized and administrative basis:
It is not clear why the existence of a taking should turn on the type
of governmental entity responsible for the taking. A city council
can take propertyjust as well as a planning commission can. Moreover, the general applicability of the ordinance should not be relevant in a takings analysis. If Atlanta had seized several hundred
homes in order to build a freeway, there would be no doubt that
16
Atlanta had taken property.
State courts today, however, are less likely to find a regulatory taking
when the exaction takes the form of a fee, including an ad hoc fee in
lieu of a dedication, or when an elected body calculates the fee
17
amount.
Two recent cases from the high-growth Northwest illustrate the
latter trend and the structural problems it raises. In Rogers Machinery,
Inc. v. Washington County, the Oregon Court of Appeals refused to ap15
See Parking Ass'n of Ga., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 450 S.E.2d 200, 203 n.3 (Ga. 1994)
(noting, in dicta, rough proportionality between the ordinance requirements and its police
power objectives).
16
515 U.S. at 1117-18 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
17
See Mark Fenster, Takings Formalism and Regulatoy Formulas:Exactions and the Consequences of Clarity, 92 CAL. L. REV. 609, 645-48 (2004) (commenting that formulaic legislation, which appears fairly calculated and imposed, is persuasive to courts that lack
expertise in land use planning). But seeJames E. Frank & Robert M. Rhodes, Introductionto
DEVELOPMENT EXACTIONS, supra note 4, at 1-3 (clarifying that the term "exaction" presupposes neither "fixed and certain" conditions nor ones resulting from "open-ended
negotiations").
It is important to emphasize that monetary exactions may be, but are not necessarily,
more closely associated with generally applicable legislative enactments than ad hoc administrative ones. Compare San Remo Hotel v. City & County of S.F., 41 P.3d 87, 91, 104
(Cal. 2002) (upholding an ordinance, which required hotel owners seeking to convert
long-term occupancy units to tourist use either to replace the units or to contribute funds
for public housing, because "no meaningful government discretion enter[ed] into either
the imposition or the calculation of the in lieu fee" and the city did not "single out [the]
plaintiffs"), with Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 436, 450 (applying Dolan to validate a $280,000 recreational mitigation fee, which was imposed by the city council, but not applying Dolan to a
$32,000 public art fee, which was mandated by ordinance at a flat one percent of total
project value and consequently upheld).
The test of intrinsic fairness this Note proposes would apply both to legislative and
administrative exactions, and is equally compelling with regard to monetary exactions as it
is regarding easements or dedications of real property. See infra Part III; cf Town of Flower
Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. P'ship, 135 S.W.3d 620, 635 (Tex. 2004) (analyzing a permit
condition that required the developer, at its own expense, to improve a public thoroughfare abutting a new subdivision and declaring, "We do not read Dolan even to hint that
exactions should be analyzed differently than dedications in determining whether there
has been a taking.").
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ply Dolan's heightened scrutiny to a traffic impact fee.' 8 The court
reasoned that particular owners would not be unduly subject to municipal discretion and the attendant increased likelihood of importune leveraging and gouging, because the contested exaction was
calculated according to a legislatively determined formula and was imposed upon predetermined subcategories of property.1 9
In contrast, a different panel of the Oregon Court of Appeals
found in Dudek v. Umatilla County that, although an ordinance affected
a broad class of property owners, the county would need to assess the
unique circumstances of the permit application before mandating an
exactionary condition. 20 Applying Dolan, the court agreed with the
land use board that exacting from one landowner the responsibility
for widening an entire street and purchasing additional right-of-way,
although required by local law, "would not be in [pro]portion to the
estimated 15% impact of the development." 2 1 Thus, the Oregon
Court of Appeals undertook a valuable level of inquiry that it had forgone in Rogers Machinery. Resisting the siren call of broad legislation,
the Dudek court instead encouraged municipal restraint out of fairness
22
to the individual property owner.
This Note similarly asserts there is little or no principled basis for
giving greater deference to exactions imposed through legislative enactment than to those imposed through adjudication. Part I contends
that, because in all practicality legislative and adjudicative land use
decisions are indistinguishable, any judicial attempt to rubber stamp
ostensible legislative exactions is flawed. Even when a court has the
opportunity to make an easy determination that an exaction is legislative, the case for its validity is in no way self-evident. By analyzing the
structural deficiencies of local democracy, Part II directly addresses
the fears of government misbehavior that underlie modern takings
jurisprudence. Given these dissatisfactions, Part III proposes the test
of intrinsic fairness, imported from corporate law, as a standard of
judicial review to apply to all contested permit conditions.
18 45 P.3d 966, 983 (Or. Ct. App. 2002), rev. denied, 52 P.3d 1057 (Or. 2002), cert.
denied, 538 U.S. 906 (2003).
19 See id. at 977-78, 983. Appendix A of the ordinance set a fee of $124 per weekday
trip generated by a newly constructed office and approximated the quantity of trips based
on the development's square footage and the number of employees working there. See id.
at 968-69.
20 See 69 P.3d 751, 756 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).
21 See id. at 753-54 (alteration in original) (citing Umatilla County's grant of the partitioning request).
22
Cf BILL HIGGINS, INST. FOR LocAL Gov'T, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND LAND USE REGULATION: A PRIMER FOR PUBLIC AGENCY STAFF 26 (rev. ed. 2005)

("Because takings law allows

for so much flexibility, a court's perception of fairness to the property owner can strongly
influence the final outcome."), http://www.cacities.org/resource_files/23045. takingsprimer5-05.pdf.
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I

CONFUSION BETWEEN LEGISLATIVE AND ADJUDICATIVE EXACTIONS

In the past decade, during which local government officials and
planning staff have grappled with the Nollan/Dolan doctrine, an observable trend has emerged in state courts nationwide, namely, "a continuum of exaction types that raise a different level of concern based
on . . . two factors: whether the exaction is a monetary one, and
23
whether it is based on a legislative versus an adjudicatory process."
That is, state courts today are less likely to find a regulatory taking
when the exaction takes the form of a fee, as opposed to a dedication
of a possessory interest in land (including easements).24 They also
typically fail to find a taking when an elected body has determined the
amount of the in lieu fee or when the fee applies to many similarly
25
situated landowners.
The trend stems from a narrow reading of Dolan, in which the
Court reasoned that the municipality must prove rough proportionality because "the city made an adjudicative decision to condition petitioner's application for a building permit on an individual parcel" 2 6
rather than a "legislative determination [ ] classifying entire areas of
the city" 27 or a "generally applicable zoning regulation[ ].'28 Justice
Souter argued in dissent that the majority mischaracterized the situation as adjudicative: The planning commission imposed conditions as
enumerated in the city's development code, which followed the State
29
of Oregon's 1973 comprehensive land use management program.
The only "adjudication" that transpired was the commission's decision
30
to deny the applicant an exemption from the legislative conditions.
23

Nancy E. Stroud, Development Exactions and Regulatory Takings-Do Monetary and Leg-

islative Exactions Get Less Takings Clause Scrutiny than Real Property and Ad Hoc Exactions?,
SJ052 ALI-ABA 881, 894 (2004).
24
See, e.g.,
Daniel J. Curtin, Jr. et al., Nollan/Dollan: The Emerging Wing in Regulatory
Takings Analysis, 28 UPB. LAw. 789, 791-95 (1996).
25 See, e.g.,
Home Builders Ass'n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993,
999-1000 (Ariz. 1997) (declining to apply Dolan to a legislatively imposed water service fee,
but at the same time emphasizing that studies on consumer demand, methodologies for
calculating fees, and a comprehensive resource management program all supported the
ordinance).
26 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994).
27

Id.

28 Id. at 391 n.8. State courts could engage in a more sophisticated analysis by distinguishing between traditional deference to state and local government authority to engage
in land use planning under the police power and a more heightened form of scrutiny
towards development exactions-which, admittedly, also find justification under the police
power. Cf City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702
(1999) ("[W]e have not extended the rough-proportionality test of Dolan beyond the special context of exactions . . ").
29
See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 413 n* (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 374 (majority opinion).
30
See id. at 413 n* (Souter, J., dissenting).
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The distinction between a legislative exaction and an adjudicative
exaction is often simultaneously debatable 3' and weighty in its consequences: "Procedural due process in the land use context is required
only for administrative or quasi-judicial decision-making [and] does
not apply to legislative decision-making." 32 Because procedural due
process necessitates an unbiased decision maker, adequate notice, the
opportunity to introduce evidence (and sometimes to conduct crossexamination), and ultimately findings that reference the governing
statute, 3 3 courts have the capacity to review many land use decisions by
scrutinizing an administrative record and thus to agree with and uphold the adjudicative decision-or to disagree with and strike it.3 4 Ju31
See, e.g., Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. P'ship, 135 S.W.3d 620, 641
(Tex. 2004) ("Nor are we convinced that a workable distinction can always be drawn between actions denominated adjudicative and legislative.").
32

BRIAN W.

BLAESSER ET AL., LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION: PRINCIPLES FOR PLAN-

NING PRACTICE 41 (Brian W. Blaesser & Alan C. Weinstein eds., 1989); see also Bi-Metallic

Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915) ("Where a rule of conduct
applies to more than a few people, it is impracticable that everyone should have a direct
voice in its adoption.... [The rights of affected individuals] are protected in the only way
that they can be in a complex society, by their power, immediate or remote, over those who
make the rule."). Within land use planning, quasi-judicial procedures-such as rezonings,
variances, and assorted appeals-comprise a subset of administrative decisions and implicate extremely fact-specific inquiries. See Stephanie Hansen, Quasi-JudicialLand-Use Decision Making in New Castle County, 4 DEL. L. REv. 191, 194-95 (2001).
33
See BLAESSER ET AL., supra note 32, at 42-43; see, e.g., Dodd v. Hood River County,
136 F.3d 1219, 1226 (9th Cir. 1998) (clarifying that an adjudicative land use proceeding
provides a full and fair opportunity to be heard "'if the parties had both a full opportunity
and the incentive to contest the point at issue on a record that also was subject to judicial
review'" (quoting Chavez v. Boise Cascade Corp., 772 P.2d 409, 411 (Or. 1989))); Pro-Eco,
Inc. v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 57 F.3d 505, 513 (7th Cir. 1995) (denying landowner's procedural
due process challenge to a moratorium on landfills because it was given notice of a public
hearing and its representative was not denied an opportunity to speak); Anderson v. Douglas County, 4 F.3d 574, 578 (8th Cir. 1993) (striking landowner's complaint of a procedural due process violation in a soil treatment permit application because he did not utilize
available procedures); Chongris v. Bd. of Appeals, 811 F.2d 36, 41 (1st Cir. 1987) (determining that applicants for a building permit and victualler's license enjoyed an opportunity to be heard where an attorney argued on their behalf at a zoning hearing, even
though no cross-examination took place); Rogin v. Bensalem Twp., 616 F.2d 680, 695 (3d
Cir. 1980) (finding that a developer, contesting the passage of zoning amendments, received sufficient due process through a hearing and a decision on the merits by the Zoning
Hearing Board and judicial review of that decision); Smith-Berch, Inc. v. Baltimore
County, 68 F. Supp. 2d 602, 628 (D. Md. 1999) (striking procedural due process claim of
the would-be operator of a methadone clinic, given that the decision maker in the zoning
petition hearing held no extrajudicial bias despite knowing that other county officials opposed such clinics); Leverett v. Town of Limon, 567 F. Supp. 471, 475 (D. Colo. 1983)
(upholding landowner's procedural due process claim because the town superintendent,
who initiated the zoning citation and participated in its affirmation on appeal, was also an
affected neighbor).
34
Cf Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 468-469 (7th Cir.
1988) ("[E]ven modern courts hesitate to treat the decision-making process as a wide-open
search for the result that is just in light of all possible considerations of distributive and
corrective justice, while legislatures are free to range widely over ethical and political considerations in deciding what regulations to impose on society. The decision to make a
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dicial capacity is weaker when land use legislation is attacked because
the information-yielding incidents of procedural due process are not
required for promulgating statutes or ordinances; 35 deferential restraint becomes the courts' logical approach. 36 Keeping these consequences in mind, section A presents a common taxonomy for the
legislative/adjudicative distinction and discusses the competing rationales for its two dominant approaches. Sections B and C respectively
contend that neither the formal nor the functional approach is helpful as applied to the undertakings of local government.
A.

The Legislative/Adjudicative Distinction

The two primary judicial approaches towards differentiating legislative and adjudicative exactions are the formal approach, followed by
the majority ofjurisdictions, and the functional approach, followed by
fewer than fifteen jurisdictions. 37 The formal approach contends that
elected officials (such as members of a state legislature, a county
board of commissioners, or a city council) engage in legislative decision making, whereas local boards and commissions, often established
by the same legislative bodies that appoint their members, engage in
administrative decision making. 38 Under this approach, a local ordinance imposing a development exaction represents a legislative decision and thus is subject only to rational basis review. 39 The functional
approach, on the other hand, examines the scope and subject of a
contested municipal action through three inquiries: (1) whether the
local government were making or applying policy (the latter denoting
adjudication); (2) whether the action were owner-initiated; and (3)
whether it affected a single parcel or a swath of properties (the latter
denoting legislation).40
judgment legislative is perforce a decision not to use judicial procedures, since they are
geared to the making of more circumscribed, more 'reasoned' judgments.").
35
See id. at 468; Daniel R. Mandelker & A. Dan Tarlock, Shifting the Presumption of
Constitutionality in Land-Use Law, 24 URB. LAw. 1, 8-10 (1992).
36
SeeJerold S. Kayden, Land-Use Regulations, Rationality, andJudicialReview: The RSVP
in the Nollan Invitation (PartI), 23 URB. LAw. 301, 304 (1991); cf Donald C. Guy &James E.
Holloway, The Direction of Regulatoiy Takings Analysis in the Post-Lochner Era, 102 DICK. L.
REv. 327, 346 (1998) ("[T]he rough proportionality test represents the application of
heightened scrutiny . . . to adjudicative actions.").
37
See Fasano v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 507 P.2d 23, 26 (Or. 1973) (en banc);
Charles L. Siemon & Julie P. Kendig, JudicialReview of Local Government Decisions: "Midnight
in the Garden of Good and Evil "20 NovA L. REv. 707, 729-32 (1996) (discussing Fasano and
its functional approach); see also Hansen, supra note 32, at 196-98 (elaborating on the
structural and the extant laws/new rules approaches).
38
See BLAESSER ET AL., supra note 32, at 11.
39
See Robert Lincoln, Executive Decisionmaking by Local Legislatures in Florida:justice,
Judicial Review and the Need for Legislative Reform, 25 STETSON L. REv. 627, 645 (1996).
40
See, e.g., Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469, 474-75 (Fla. 1993)
(holding that the board's decision to rezone a half-acre parcel was quasi-judicial because it
applied policy and affected only a limited number of people).

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91:699

As mentioned above, the majority of courts, local governments,
and litigants-especially those with slim budgets-appreciate the
bright-line efficiency of formalism. 41 One court's rationale for classifying a rezoning as a legislative act typifies the cut-and-dried nature of
the formal approach:
[A] decision on an application for rezoning is a legislative act. Rezoning is accomplished by amendment of a zoning ordinance and
by the same procedure as the original enactment, and a city council's act in amending a zoning ordinance to exclude previously included property [of any size] is a legislative and not administrative
act.

42

Courts adopting the formal approach do not defer to special use permits or variances. 43 Although these land use planning tools are not
distinguishable on the ground from rezonings that affect single parcels or smaller areas, they must be accompanied by administrative
findings and are disconnected from legislation. 44 Therefore, the formal approach strengthens a court's inclination not to apply Nollan!
Dolan analysis to an exaction established via ordinance and consequently to uphold the municipality's action against a developer's
45
claim.
41
See Thomas G. Pelham, Quasi-JudicialRezonings: A Commentary on the Snyder Decision
and the Consistency Requirement, 9J. LAND USE & ENVrL. L. 243, 278-79 (1994).
42
Toso v. City of Santa Barbara, 162 Cal. Rptr. 210, 214 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (citations

omitted).
43 See Topanga Ass'n for a Scenic Cmty. v. County of L.A., 522 P.2d 12, 14-15 (Cal.
1974).
44
See id. at 16.
45
Cf Todd W. Prall, Comment, Dysfunctional Distinctions in Land Use: The Failure of
Legislative/Adjudicative Distinctionsin Utah and the Casefor a Uniform Standard of Review, 2004
BYU L. REV. 1049, 1062 ("[The formal] approach grants more deference to local government decisions because it allows local governments to determine whether a particular decision is adjudicative or legislative by choosing which process to employ to make the
decision.").
The municipal code of Fayetteville, Tennessee exemplifies an exaction established via
ordinance:
Whenever a parcel of land is subdivided and the subdivision plat shows one
or more lots containing more than one acre of land or double the minimum required area for any zoning district in which the lot is located, and
the planningcommission has reason to believe that any such lot(s) will be resubdivided into smaller building sites, the planning commission may require
that the subdivision and development of such parcel of land allow for the
future opening of public ways and the ultimate extension of adjacent public
ways. The planning commission may also require that dedications providing for the future opening and extension of such public ways be indicated
on the plat.
FAYETTEVILLE, TENN., SUBDIVISION REGULATIONS art. 1-108.2 (2005) (emphasis added),
available at http://www.fayettevillem.com/subdivision-regulations2.htm. Note that the ordinance allows the planning commission case-by-case discretion to determine whether resubdivision might occur. Practically speaking, a developer's successful application for an
initial rezoning or variance could transform a parcel's relevant zoning district to one with a
larger minimum lot size, thus eliminating the planning commission's right to seek an exac-
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The functional approach is more likely than the formal approach
to determine that a decision is adjudicative because it values the
strong interest that property owners and other affected citizens have
"in a rational local decision-making process that affords fair treatment
and due process and produces decisions based on previously established policies and standards rather than the undue political influence of a particular applicant, industry or constituency." 46 Advocates
of the functional approach contend that the more complete record of
adjudicative proceedings enables courts-despite acting retrospectively and as outsiders-to evaluate the fairness and appropriateness
of boards' and commissions' application of certain standards to individuals. 47 Because permit conditions seemingly impact a limited number of parties and interests, emerge from an administrative assessment
of the facts and available options, and also implement policy, the functional approach would classify them as adjudicative and therefore trig48
ger Nollan/Dolan analysis.
B.

The Formal Approach Reaches Inconsistent Results

The formal approach reaches inconsistent results when applied
to the decisions of local government because, unlike their federal and
state counterparts, local legislative, executive, and judicial branches
often overlap. 49 Dillon's Rule clarifies: Local governments possess no
inherent powers, rather .they are limited to those powers the state constitution or legislature expressly or implicitly grants to them, and to
those powers absolutely necessary to implement the purposes of the
municipal corporation. 50 Before a municipality may zone, levy exactionary condition (in the form of the mandatory dedication of a public fight of way) when
later faced with the developer's proposed subdivision plat for that parcel.
46
Pelham, supra note 41, at 279.
47
See Fasano v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 507 P.2d 23, 26-27 (Or. 1973) (en banc).
48
See, e.g., Snyder v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 595 So. 2d 65, 80-82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1991), quashed on other grounds, 627 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1993).
49
See OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., HANDBOOK OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAw § 65, at 195
(1982) ("The tripartite division of the federal and state governments into independent
branches is not reflected in the set-up of a great many cities."); Carol M. Rose, Planningand
Dealing: PiecemealLand Controls as Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CAL. L. REv. 837, 846 (1983)
("[P]iecemeal local land decisions should not be classed as either 'legislative' or 'judicial';
these rubrics are drawn from a separation-of-powers doctrine more appropriate to larger
governmental units.").
50
Merriam v. Moody's Ex'rs, 25 Iowa 163, 170 (1868) (Dillon, CJ.); see also Hunter v.
City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907) ("Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the state, created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental
powers of the state as may be intrusted to them."); 2A EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 10.03 (DennisJensen & Gail A. O'Gradney eds., 3d ed., rev.
1996) (sources of municipal power). But see State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116, 1118-20
(Utah 1980) (rejecting strict construction of Dillon's Rule); PLATr, supra note 3, at 252
(noting that home rule, which is allowed by fifteen states, articulates frustration with Dillon's Rule).
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tions, or impose other land use controls, the state must first delegate
its police power to the local government and define the appropriate
subject matter for its exercise. 5 1 In this way, even an appointed land
use board's supposedly adjudicative decision bears legislative
52
imprimatur.
Three examples illustrate how the formal approach fails to draw
meaningful boundaries between legislative and adjudicative decisions
and the problem this causes in determining the proper standard of
review for a particular exaction. First, land use boards and other
unelected adjudicative bodies often negotiate development exactions
pursuant to a comprehensive plan mandated by the state legislature
and approved by the local legislative body. 53 Such plans may desig51
See, e.g., STANDARD CITY PLANNING ENABLING AcT (Advisory Comm. on City Planning
and Zoning 1928), reprinted in 8 ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 53.01A (Patrick J.
Rohan ed., 1991).
52
See Rose, supra note 49, at 853 (supporting the treatment of local government actions as legislative by raising the points that local governments exercise wide police powers,
may enjoy the insulation of home rule, and are governed by elected representatives); see,
e.g., Curtis v. Town of S. Thomaston, 708 A.2d 657, 658-59 (Me.1998) (finding that a
planning board's conditioned approval of a subdivision on the construction of a fire pond
and the grant of dedicated easement under the municipality's Fire Protection Ordinance
did not constitute an unlawful taking).
53
See, e.g., McCarthy v. City of Leawood, 894 P.2d 836, 838, 848 (Kan. 1995) (upholding impact fees that applied to the "K-150 Corridor" traffic artery as depicted in the city's
Master Development Plan); Schultz v. City of Grants Pass, 884 P.2d 569, 570, 573 (Or.
1994) (striking down conditioned dedications for, inter alia, county and city rights-of-way,
which would run along two streets designated in the Grants Pass and Urbanizing Area
Comprehensive Community Development Plan and the City Master Transportation Plan,
and rejecting the city's argument that given several implementing ordinances, the conditions are legislative and should be accorded deference); Home Builders Ass'n of Dayton v.
City of Beavercreek, Nos. 97-CA-113, 97-CA-115, 1998 WL 735931, at *1,*6-7 (Ohio Ct.
App. Oct. 23, 1998), rev'd, 729 N.E.2d 349 (Ohio 2000) (passing on the constitutionality of
a municipal impact fee ordinance, which relied upon the Beavercreek Land Use Plan forecast of residential, office, and commercial growth within the impact fee district); supra note
29 and accompanying text; see alsoJOHNSON, supra note 4, at 71 (explaining that comprehensive plans incorporate maps of the community's projected land uses, thoroughfares,
and sensitive areas); Brian W. Blaesser and Daniel R. Mandelker, Official Maps, in MODERNIZING STATE PLANNING STATUTES

153, 156 (American Planning Association, The Growing

Smart Working Papers, vol. 2, 1996-98) ("J]ustifying an exaction in an official map area
should not be difficult if careful planning has preceded the designation of a transportation
corridor and if the exaction is related to transportation needs."); cf.N. Ill. Home Builders
Ass'n v. County of Du Page, 649 N.E.2d 384, 387-88 (I1. 1995) (concerning constitutional
challenges to two state enabling statutes and three county ordinances-the latter adopted
under this delegated authority-that allowed county boards to impose transportation impact fees on new development at the time a building permit is issued). See generally CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 65300 (LexisNexis 2005) (requiring that each planning agency prepare, and
each county and city legislative body adopt, "a comprehensive, long-term general plan for
the physical development of the county or city, and of any land outside itsboundaries
which in the planning agency's judgment bears relation to its planning"); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 163.3177, -.
3194 (LexisNexis 2005) (requiring municipalities to adopt a comprehensive
plan with certain mandatory elements, and specifying that "all land development regulations" be consistent with the comprehensive plan).
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nate geographic and programmatic areas for public and private development, transportation and community facilities, historic
preservation, urban renewal, or capital improvements. 54 Under the
formal approach, for instance, a county that conditions a development permit on the construction of an emergency access road should
be able to defend the exaction on the basis of the state's delegation of
the police power as embodied in the comprehensive plan. Faced with
this situation, the Colorado Supreme Court nonetheless focused on
the due process requirements of the adjudicative permitting process
and found that the jurisdiction failed to adopt regulations that were
"sufficiently detailed to provide all users and potential users of land
55
with notice of the particular standards and requirements."
Second, the state power delegated to a local legislative or administrative body may be tightly restricted or, alternatively, may allow for
significant discretion. Low-level and intermediate authorities are
often forced to impose legislatively determined exactions in a discretionary fashion, for example in deciding whether a particular kind of
land use belongs to a statutory classification that exempts the property
owners from paying a school, traffic, or other impact fee. 56 Where the
statute provides a dedication or fee schedule, the discretion of local
authorities is typically limited in scope and the resulting exaction is
only minimally adjudicative. 5 7 The formal approach, however, would
declare both sets of exactions legislative and deserving of equal
deference.
Maximizing the confusion, the extent of adjudicative discretion
enjoyed by a land use planning body at times depends on the interaction between the local built environment and the nature of the regulation. 58 Consider an appointed commission that, pursuant to an
historic district ordinance, approves architectural plans for new con54
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3177 (West 2005); MD. CODE. ANN. art. 66B, § 1.03
(LexisNexis 2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 11-6-14 (2005); see alsoJOHNSON, supra note 4, at
72 (table of contents for a typical comprehensive plan).
55
Beaver Meadows v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 709 P.2d 928, 936 (Colo. 1985) (en
banc).
56
See, e.g., Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 135
(Fla. 2000).
57
See, e.g.,
FAIRBANKS NORTH STAR BOROUGH, ALASKA, CODE tit. 17, ch. 17.60.090
(2005), available at http://www.co.fairbanks.ak.us/Assembly/CodeofOrdinance.htm (calculating the width of a trail easement dedication based on a trail's historic category, its
current nonmotorized or multipurpose use, and the average subdivision lot size); Krupp v.
Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687, 693-94, 697-98 (Colo. 2001) (en banc) (holding that a plant investment fee, levied on all building projects within the district, which
derived from a single family equivalent unit schedule and comprised one aspect of comprehensive legislation, did not lend itself to constitutional analysis).
58
Compare Anderson v. City of Issaquah, 851 P.2d 744, 751 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993)
(finding that an ordinance, which required buildings to be "harmonious," "interesting,"
and "compatible," was unconstitutionally vague), with Rolling Pines Ltd. P'ship v. City of
Little Rock, 40 S.W.3d 828, 834-35 (Ark. Ct. App. 2001) (rejecting a void-for-vagueness
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struction and exterior changes to extant structures. 59 Commissioners
and their professional staff could then condition neighborhood development on such costly exactions as restoring facades, documenting or
preserving a portion of the site, or maintaining a rhythmic cityscape
despite inefficient siting. 60 If the district exhibits a very distinctive
"look" (such as the Vieux Carr6 in New Orleans, or the Georgetown
neighborhood in Washington, D.C.), the commission's discretion
would be tightly bounded and its decisions more legislative. If the
district displays only a traditional "feel" (such as a dilapidated New
England village with much surface parking and infill), the commission
would have much broader discretion and its decisions would arguably
be more adjudicative.
The third example of the blurred boundary between legislative
and adjudicative exactionary conditions is the most convincing: Local
government may cycle among formal legislative, adjudicative, and judicial modes without violating state constitutional provisions or due
process safeguards. 6 1 Moreover, local practice may tacitly condone
elected representatives acting legislatively or adjudicatively in different exaction-levying contexts. 6 2 The following list of New Castle
County, Delaware procedures depicts the tangle:
County Council acts legislatively when conducting hearings (while
incorporating aspects of quasi-judicial decision making) on the following subjects: (1) zoning text amendment, (2) zoning map
amendment, (3) historic zoning district map amendment, (4) deed
restriction change, (5) level-of-service waiver, and (6) zoning map
correction. County Council acts in its purely quasi-judicial role
when it (1) hears appeals from the Historic Review Board regarding
historic permits, (2) consents to a use variance granted by the
Board of Adjustment, (3) hears appeals regarding subdivision variances from the Planning Board, and (4) hears appeals regarding
63
beneficial-use permits from the Board of Adjustment.

challenge to a compatibility standard when deciding whether to allow manufactured
homes in a "residential" subdivision).
This example is based on BLAESSER ET AL., supra note 32, at 19-20.
See Lawrence A. McDermott, Exactions, InfrastructureEnhancements, and Fees, in LAND
DEVELOPMENT HANDBOOK: PLANNING, ENGINEE NG, AND SURVEYING 67, 69 (Sidney 0. Dewberry ed., 2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter McDermott, Exactions].
61
See, e.g., Londoner v. City of Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 386 (1908) (city council acting as
board of equalization); Turner v. City of Mobile, 424 So. 2d 578, 580 (Ala. 1982) (mayor,
administrative official, and local legislator to sit, per statute, on planning commission);
Venhaus v. Pulaski County Quorum Court, 726 S.W.2d 668, 669-70 (Ark. 1987) (county
judge acting as county chief administrative officer); Village of Covington v. Lyle, 433
N.E.2d 597, 599-600 (Ohio 1982) (mayor presiding over local court).
62
See Hansen, supra note 32, at 209.
63 Id. (footnotes omitted).
59
60
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Evidently, attempts to categorize legislative and adjudicative exactions
based on the nomenclature of the decision-making body often reach
inconsistent results.

C.

64

The Functional Approach Is Problematic

Commentators criticize the functional approach as fuzzy, particularly when courts utilize the approach to differentiate between legislative and adjudicative decision making when a development exaction is
contested. 65 If legislative decisions apply to large groups of citizens,
and adjudicative decisions are more individualized, the nature of an
exaction may morph simply when the number of applicants increases
or decreases or when numerous applicants apply as a group rather
than as individuals-to the complete disregard of parcel size and onthe-ground effects on the community at large. 66 The puzzles only
multiply. For example, it is unclear how a court utilizing the functional approach should categorize an exaction when one person owns
a large parcel 67 or when many people, collectively, own comparatively
little land. 68 Furthermore, development exactions that seem adjudica-

tive by virtue of affecting only one parcel, one property owner, and
one pocketbook inevitably affect many area residents (both those who
own property and those who do not) through their property values,
taxes, or rents; the public services and amenities available to them; or
their overall satisfaction with the community they call home. 69
64
Compare Smith v. Skagit County, 453 P.2d 832, 835, 849 (Wash. 1969) (en banc)
(declaring a zoning amendment that allowed an aluminum company to operate a plant on
470 acres of a 5,500-acre residential-recreational island to be legislative), with Davis County
v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d 704, 709-10, 712 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the city
council must ground its denial of a special use permit in an adjudicatory record because an
administrative board usually makes this type of decision).
65
See generally Scott H. Parker & John E. Schwab, Forecast: Cloudy but Clearing-Land

Use Remedies in Oregon, 15 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 245, 255-62 (1979) (claiming that the functional approach produces contentious litigation and highly inconsistent results); Siemon &
Kendig, supra note 37, at 731-34 (positing additional reasons why few jurisdictions utilize
the functional approach).
66
See Lincoln, supra note 39, at 646-47.
67
Compare Battaglia Props., Ltd. v. Fla. Land & Water Adjudicatory Comm'n, 629 So.
2d 161, 162, 165 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (adjudicative rezone of a 120-acre parcel), and
Neuberger v. City of Portland, 603 P.2d 771, 772, 777 (Or. 1979) (adjudicative rezone of a
601-acre parcel), with Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Karp, 662 So. 2d 718, 719-20 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1995) (legislative rezone of forty-eight separate lots constituting 179-acre parcel).
68
Compare Green v. Hayward, 552 P.2d 815, 816, 822 (Or. 1976) (adjudicative rezone
of neighboring fifty-acre and ninety-acre parcels), with Parelius v. City of Lake Oswego, 539
P.2d 1123, 1124 (Or. Ct. App. 1975) (legislative rezone of a seventy-three-acre parcel "in
widely diverse ownership").
69
Cf Michael S. Holman, Comment, Zoning Amendments-The Product of Judicial or
Quasi-JudicialAction,33 OHIO ST. L.J. 130, 138 (1972) (observing that changes in the use of
one parcel represent "existing but often unstated land use policies" that alter the legal uses
of surrounding parcels (emphasis omitted)).
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Another criticism of the functional approach centers on the inconsistencies that arise through its focus on the incidents of legislative
and administrative action, rather than on the reason behind the particular feature. 70 For instance, some statutes require an agency or
commission to make certain findings and conduct public hearings
before designating an area as blighted, which may (under the right
circumstances) attract redevelopment funding from the state or federal government and thereby provide incentives for private endeavors. 71 If a developer contests a permit condition that is imposed on a
project within such a neighborhood, the reviewing court must first
select its desired standard of review by deciding whether the existence
of findings and a hearing (characterizing adjudication) outweigh the
designation of urban renewal and the creation of a conduit for grant
monies (characterizing legislation) .72 The functional approach provides no guidance for making this crucial decision; the number of
people or sqbiare miles affected is hardly an adequate basis. 7 3
Finally, the functional approach collapses when applied to development exactions due to the outlook of the civil servants who carry
out the work of city councils, land use boards, planning commissions,
and regional agencies.7 4 Today's planners "tend to see themselves not
as power wielders but as specialized problem solvers, '75 and thus infuse discretion into site-specific decisions regardless whether the decisions fall within the scope of zoning or environmental ordinances,
housing or building codes, judicial precedent, or local regulation. 76
At the same time, a perceived legislative mandate constrains adjudicative-like discretion: Public planners are conscious of the source of
their paychecks and are unlikely to implement a progressive or post77
modernist agenda through imaginative exactions.
See Lincoln, supra note 39, at 647.
See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 99.370 (West 2005); NY GEN. MUN. LAW §§ 504-05
(McKinney 2005).
72
See Lincoln, supra note 39, at 647.
73
See supra notes 67-69.
74
See generally Lawrence A. McDermott, The Rezoning Process, in LAND DEVELOPMENT
HANDBOOK: PLANNING, ENGINEERING, AND SURVEYING, supra note 60, at 169, 173 [hereinafter
McDermott, Rezoning] (advising developers not to underestimate the power of individual
bureaucrats and to maintain good rapport with planning staff before, during, and after the
review process for a specific project).
75
JOHNSON, supra note 4, at 81.
76
See CHARLES HOCH, WHAT PLANNERS Do: POWER, POLITICS, AND PERSUASION 149-50,
325-28 (1994) (interviewing a zoning administrator who chose to "drag [his] feet" in enforcing a parking ordinance in a Hispanic neighborhood despite pressure from the director of health, whom he suspected was racially motivated).
77
See MICHAEL P. BROOKS, PLANNING THEORY FOR PRACTITIONERS 41 (2002); see also
American Institute of Certified Planners Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct (effective June 1, 2005), http://www.planning.org/ethics/conduct'html ("We shall accept the
decisions of our client or employer concerning the objectives and nature of the professional services we perform unless the course of action is illegal or plainly inconsistent with
70
71
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II
THE PLAYERS AND LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT ARE DISPOSITIE

Because modern takings jurisprudence embodies a fear of government misbehavior, it frequently expresses the need for oversight
"to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." 7s Ensconced within the trend favoring judicial defer-

ence to ostensibly legislative exactions (and the quest to differentiate
them from adjudicative exactions) hides the assumption that a development exaction stemming from an ordinance or other local legislative action holds less potential for extortionate results than one-on-

one bargaining over a permit condition between unequally matched
parties. 79 Within a democracy, developers and applicant landowners
should have the opportunity to influence the political process on an
equal footing with local citizens (and perhaps resident noncitizens).80
This Part argues, however, that due to structural deficiencies in local
government, legislative exactions hold as much potential for overreaching as their adjudicative counterparts. Section A applies Madisonian considerations of "faction" to local politics, and section B
evaluates whether municipal authority measures up to the antifederalist ideals of local competencies, local voices, and local loyalties.
our primary obligation to the public interest."); cf Oren Yiftachel, Planningand Social Control: Exploring the Dark Side, 12 J. PLAN. LITERATURE 395, 395 (1998) ("Far less attention is
devoted to planning's advancement of regressive goals such as social oppression, economic
inefficiency, male domination, or ethnic marginalization.").
78 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). In this regard, it is helpful to
make the connection that in modulating the invocation of the police power, the Nollan!
Dolan doctrine either frees or saddles taxpayers as a class from or with the burden that
would ensue were local government to compensate-with or without much resistanceindividual property owners for their takings claims and then seek to replenish the public
fisc through taxes. Cf Roger Clegg, Reclaiming the Text of the Takings Clause, in REGULATORY
TAKINGS: RESTORING PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS 7, 31-32 (Roger Clegg ed., 1994) (sug-

gesting that the Nollan/Dolan doctrine represents an attempt by the conservatives on the
Supreme Court to limit the "zoning and 'land-use regulation' exception" to the Takings
Clause).
79 See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (describing easement
in exchange for development approval as "'an out-and-out plan of extortion'" (quoting
J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Town of Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (N.H. 1981))); Ann E. Carlson
& Daniel Pollak, Takings on the Ground: How the Supreme Court's TakingsJurisprudenceAffects
Local Land Use Decisions, 35 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 103, 151 (2001) (noting use of the slogan
"Exaction = Extortion" by opponents to a county's comprehensive plan, which called for
trail easements); see also DOUGLAS T. KENDALL ET AL., TAKINGS LITIGATION HANDBOOK: DEFENDING TAKINGS CHALLENGES TO LAND USE REGULATIONS 305 n.147 (2000) ("We strongly

recommend that government counsel use the [descriptive] terms 'dedications,' 'impact
fees,' and, collectively, 'development charges' or 'permit conditions' rather than the
[vague and sometimes pejorative] term 'exactions' ....
).
80
See Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Beyond the Counter-Majoritarian
Difficulty:JudicialDecisionMaking in a Polynomic World, 53 RUTGERS L. REv. 781, 790 (2001).
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Local Government Fails Madisonian Considerations

Our country's system of land use controls is historically homegrown, that is, local in nature so as to meet the needs of individual
communities. 8 1 Nevertheless, since the mid-1960s, practitioners and
academics have become increasingly reluctant to trust local government to make land use decisions fairly (i.e., "with a reasonable distribution of burdens"8 2 among residents or property owners) and
rationally (i.e., "with the care and deliberation" 83 appropriate to the
long-term effects of these decisions) .84 A look to America's early political building blocks-particularly James Madison's The Federalist No.
10-counterposed against the antifederalist tradition, makes these
doubts both surprising and understandable, and underscores the
need of developers, planners, and attorneys for a test of intrinsic fairness for contested development exactions.
In The federalist No. 10, Madison asserts that the main obstacle to
legislative fairness is "faction," or the tendency of one interest group
to impose its will on others.8 5 Only a constituency of sufficient size
and variety could ensure that legislation emerges from a collaborative
process. 8 6 Caught in negotiations among multiple parties, legislators
would be forced to consider the long-term effects of their decisions on
the public welfare and thus indirectly bolster a philosophy of judicial
deference to legislative action. 87 Conversely, the legislative body of a
too small or too homogenous constituency would never develop a
beneficial multiplicity of interests. 88 Local corruption, domination by
a few, and sweeping passion would silence minority concerns. 89
81
82
83

See Rose, supra note 49, at 839.
Id.
Id.

84 See Mandelker & Tarlock, supra note 35, at 5-7 (illustrating the tension between
exclusionary purpose of zoning and jurisprudential fiction "that units of local government
are the contemporary embodiment of the Greek polis").
85
See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 56-57 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
86 See id. at 63-65.
87
Cf Frank H. Easterbrook, The State of Madison's Vision of the State: A Public Choice
Perspective, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1328, 1346-47 (1994) (arguing that a decrease in the checks
on the interest groups that affect governmental institutions means difficulty for a court in
deciphering legislative intent).
88
See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 85, at 61-63; cf Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of
Group Polarization,in DEBATING DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 80, 90 (James S. Fishkin & Peter
Laslett eds., Philosophy, Politics and Society No. 7, 2003) (offering "a plea for ensuring
that deliberation occurs within a large and heterogeneous public sphere, and for guarding
against a situation in which like-minded people are walling themselves off from alternative
perspectives").
89
See, e.g., City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 389 (1991)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing THE FEDERAuST No. 10, supra note 85, for the proposition
that it is the "greater tendency of smaller societies to promote oppressive and narrow interests above the common good"); cf WILuAm A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAw, EcoNOMICS, AND POLITICS 292-94 (1995)
(recounting the lobbying success of billboard
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Where the minority and the majority are evenly matched, their probable failure to find common ground would deadlock government on
the issue at hand.9 0
Municipal faction is not a theoretical construct. Judicial deference to comprehensive plans and to the exactions they foster "beg[s]
the question of the legitimacy of the plan itself; for even plan consistency requirements [that are intended to ensure the legality of an exactionary condition] leave the setting of goals to the same local
governments whose other land use decisions are suspect." 9 1 Planners
admit that they often zone large tracts unrealistically to create for
themselves an artificially strong bargaining position. 9 2 For example, a
municipality may knowingly situate capital investments, such as roads
and public facilities, so as to foster development pressures in areas its
comprehensive plan declares low density. 9 3 When developers and
property owners seek to capitalize on the potential profit in these areas, the municipality may demand an ad hoc exaction under the guise
of granting a zoning amendment. 94 Local government thus transforms overregulation into currency by receiving land, facilities, or
95
money "in return for" development it wanted to begin with.
Even where no impropriety is implicated, decision-making theory
96
still undermines the rationality and efficacy of comprehensive plans.
In general, local land use planning processes are structured to collect,
and then reflect, public participation, but absent a concrete problem
or project under discussion, the public is not engaged. 9 7 Only imminent projects spark opposition, although comparable developments
may have been equally foreseeable before the comprehensive plan was

companies, on a national level, in securing compensation for signs removed under federal
legislation).
90 See, e.g., Carlson & Pollak, supra note 79, at 147-51 (detailing a battle, which lasted
over a decade, between habitat preservationists and backers of economic development in a
community that tried to amend its comprehensive plan).
91
Rose, supra note 49, at 874 (footnote omitted).
92
See LEVY, supra note 5, at 123.
93
See id. at 123, 125.
94
See id. at 125.
95
See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1413,
1494-96 (1989); see also Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 n.5 (1987)
("Thus, the importance of the purpose underlying the [land use] prohibition not only
does not justify the imposition of unrelated conditions for eliminating the prohibition, but
positively militates against the practice.").
96
See Rose, supra note 49, at 874-75.
97
See, e.g.,
DeSena v. Guide, 265 N.Y.S.2d 239, 245-46 (App. Div. 1965) (foregrounding a neighborhood's protest against proposed development project in a residential area,
although a recent comprehensive plan had zoned the site light industrial), cited with approval in Rose, supra note 49, at 875.
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promulgated and could well have been addressed through earlierand extensive-public debate.9 8
B.

Exit and Voice Do Not Save Antifederalist Conceptions

If federalist principles weaken against the reality of local politics,
the next step is to examine whether the persistent antifederalist tradition supports local legislative decisions. Moderate opponents to constitutional ratification advocated decentralized local governments that
were consensual and participatory; place-based impulses would replace federal arrangements.9 9 Antifederalist thought is traceable
through such varied examples as the mid-nineteenth century municipal reform movement (reacting, in part, to state legislative incursions
into city affairs), 1 00 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development grant funding guidelines (requiring proof of constituent participation in project planning),1 0 ' and the influence of advocacy
planning on conventional practice (facilitating collaboration with lowincome, grassroots, and special interest groups). 102
In short, this strand of antifederalism holds that local competencies, local voices, and local loyalties ensure rationality in the design
and governance of America's cities and suburbs.1 0 3 The technical expertise of traditional bureaucrats and the competency of local governing bodies, however, differ considerably.
Because an
administrative agency justifies its power on the basis of staff expertise,
its discretion is limited to a defined subject matter such as environmental protection or welfare benefits. A municipality exists, on the
98 See Gerrit Knaap, Land Use Politics in Oregon, in PLANNING THE OREGON WAY: A
TWEN'Y-YEAR EVALUATION 3, 14-16 (Carl Abbott et al. eds., 1994) (terming phenomenon
an "implementation deficit" between land use plans and land use decisions); cf McDermott, Rezoning, supra note 74, at 184-86 (offering tips for developers on keeping officials
and citizens sufficiently focused during lengthy and uncomfortable evening public
hearings).
99
See SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTI-FEDERALISM AND THE DISSENTING
TRADITION IN AMERICA, 1788-1828, at 217-18 (1999).
100 See M. CHRISTINE BOYER, DREAMING THE RATIONAL CITY: THE MYTH OF AMERICAN
CITY PLANNING 114-18 (1983).
101 See, e.g., Municipality of Anchorage, Alaska, Cmty. Dev. Div., Applicationfor Certification as a Community Housing Development Organization (CHDO), 1, http://www.muni.org/
iceimages/CDBG/CHDOApplicationSept04.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2006).
102
See BROOKS, supra note 77, at 114-17.
103 Cf VINCENT OSTROM, THE INTELLECTUAL CRISIS IN AMERICAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 97-99 (2d ed. 1989) ("Fragmentation of authority among diverse decision centers
with multiple veto capabilities within any one jurisdiction and the development of multiple, overlapping jurisdictions of widely different scales are necessary conditions for maintaining a stable political order that can advance human welfare under rapidly changing
conditions."). But see GORDON L. CLARK, JUDGES AND THE CITIES: INTERPRETING LOCAL AUTONOMY 196 (1985) (arguing that decentralized land use decisions are double-edged); cf
Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 1 (1990) ("Localism reflects territorial economic and social inequalities and reinforces them with political power.").
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other hand, because the state has granted it powers (pursuing effisolely by geociency or following tradition), and its authority is limited
10 4
delegation.
statutory
of
extent
the
graphic area and
Although planning commissions, platting boards, and boards of
equalization make many of the land use decisions of local government, only a percentage of those citizens who volunteer as commissioners or board members have relevant experience as architects,
realtors, attorneys, civil engineers, developers, appraisers, surveyors,
or property managers. The rest rely on civic commitment and staff
guidance, when available. 10 5 The planner who fosters public participation must, however, operate within policy channels carved out by
the strongest community faction. 10 6 Essentially, "good professional
[planning] practice comes less from the application and display of
expertise and more through the clarity, efficacy, and popularity of

planning

visions
07

and

arguments

shaped

through

political

deliberation."1

The second strand of the antifederalist argument for self-defined
and self-governed communities concerns local voice, 108 that is, the
ability to express oneself and promote one's interests within the political process.10 9 With some exceptions, residents have voice in their
local government, but the developers who bear the brunt of exaction
policies seldom do. 110 Typically these developers are national or inSee supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
See HOCH, supra note 76, at 57 (interviewing a planning director who helped planning commission "learn to do planning" and "make useful and reasonable land use
decisions").
106
See id. at 60-65 (narrating how an experienced planning director was fired because
he was not as pro-development as the village trustees would have liked); see also JOE R.
FEAGIN, FREE ENTERPRISE CITY. HOUSTON IN POLITICAL-ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 156-58,
161-62 (1988) (analyzing the repeated success of Houston's conservative business and real
estate interests in quashing public and private initiatives to establish planning and zoning
for the city); cf Susan S. Fainstein, The Changing World Economy and Urban Restructuring,in
LEADERSHIP AND URBAN REGENERATION 31, 43 (Dennis Judd & Michael Parkinson eds.,
1990) ("Cities are limited in their autonomy not only by general economic forces but also
by the national political system of which they form a part. Ideological, institutional, and
fiscal factors constrain their ability to operate in political isolation from the rest of the
nation.").
HOCH, supra note 76, at 345.
107
108 The term "voice," frequently used in the legal literature on local government and
land use planning, borrows from ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
Cf DAVID HARVEY, SPACES OF CAPITAL: TOWARDS A CRITICAL GEOGRAPHY 128-57
109
(2001) (providing examples of the 1956 formation of the Greater Baltimore Committee
and its Charles Center urban renewal project, along with the gradual erosion of a broadbased civic coalition that arose after the riots of 1968 and 1970, to depict how voice was
unavailable to "an underclass of impoverished blacks and marginalized whites" occupying
inner-city Baltimore, "capture [d] by the narrower forces of commercialism, property development, and financial power").
11o See FISCHEL, supra note 89, at 133.
104
105
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ternational companies, and neither their management nor their rankand-file employees have the opportunity to vote in local elections or to
integrate themselves into the politics of a small community."'
Through permit conditions, insiders thereby oppress outsiders in a
variation of "taxation without representation."'" 12 Some outsider developers are able to carve out for themselves a certain amount of
voice-at least for a while, until their very success compels the community to impose exactions it originally thought advantageous to
1 13
waive.
Despite insider status or collectively large holdings, many owners
of undeveloped land are hampered in combating confiscatory municipal regulatory behavior if only because homeowners, well-organized in
common concern over property values, outnumber them.11 4 After all,
once the question of development changes from "should we charge"
to "how much should we charge," homeowners (and voting renters)
favor stiff exactions, which generate immediate returns through lower
property taxes, stable rents, and expanded municipal services.'1 5 Additionally, small-town politicians rarely depend on political contributions from interest groups; consequently, if owners of undeveloped
land were to try that route, homeowners could quickly punish the of11 6
fending politicians at the polls.
As the stable product of a specific "exit-voice" mix, local loyalties
represent the third strand of the antifederalist argument. Where
III SeeJOHNSON, supra note 4, at 50-51. But see Soules v. Kauaians for Nukolii Campaign Comm., 849 F.2d 1176 (9th Cir. 1988) (involving a developer-landowner who financed a referendum that, by reinstating a zoning ordinance favorable to resorts, in end
effect overturned the results of a grassroots referendum held some years earlier); JOHNSON,
supra note 4, at 50 (describing the Irvine Company, which boasts historical roots in Orange
County, California and close connections to local public officials).
112
See GENE BUNNELL, MAKING PLACES SPECIAL: STORIES OF REAL PLACES MADE BETTER
BY PLANNING 462 (2002) ("'The real reason [the City of San Diego] impose[s] those high
developer fees is because we have an aversion to taxing ourselves to pay for things.'" (quoting the executive director of the San Diego Housing Commission)).
113

See, e.g., JAMES HOWARD KUNSTLER, THE GEOGRAPHY OF NOWHERE: THE RISE AND DE-

CLINE OF AMERICA'S MAN-MADE LANDSCAPE 223 (1993)

(recounting that Disney Corporation

refused to pay transportation impact fees despite 80,000 visitors daily until county officials
threatened to repeal the economic development legislation that exempted Disney World
from land use controls); Carl Abbott, The Oregon Planning Style, in PLANNING THE OREGON
WAY- A TWENY-YEAR EVALUATION, supra note 98, at 205, 216-17 (relating how the founders

of Rajneeshpuram, Oregon relied on money, legal savvy, and a sense of moral superiority
to expand their initial holdings until county residents and an environmental advocacy
group stopped the self-styled utopia's growth through building inspections and other administrative controls).
114
See FISCHEL, supra note 89, at 298-99.
115
Cf Stewart E. Sterk, Competition Among Municipalities as a Constraint on Land Use
Exactions, 45 VAND. L. REV. 831, 858 (1992) [hereinafter Sterk, Competition]
("[Homeowners must wait until they sell their homes to realize the pecuniary gains associated with a restrictive zoning ordinance.").
116
See FISCHEL, supra note 89, at 297-98.
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households and enterprises are completely mobile, loyalty refers to
the satisfaction of consumers who have looked around, and have
found, the particularly ideal place to live or operate. 1 7 Among municipalities competing for population, economic growth, and image,
exit occurs when residents, homeowners, businesses, or developers
move away because they are convinced their voices are not sufficiently
strong to ensure a quality lifestyle or financial environment. 11 Because local governments rely on taxes to finance infrastructure and
basic services such as education and law enforcement, public officials
strive to prevent residential and commercial exit by assembling a desirable package of goods and services as inexpensively as possible." 19
If competition enhances loyalty, structural policing mechanisms
make the heightened judicial scrutiny of exactions unnecessary despite the flaws of local competencies and local voice. A developer,
disappointed in the permit conditions that a municipality offered her,
20
could bring the project proposal to a more welcoming jurisdiction.
Indeed, a recent survey of California planners revealed that growthhungry communities set their impact fees to enhance competitiveness,
even after their community development or legal departments have
concluded that the municipality may lawfully increase its exaction
levels.' 21 The mayor of an expanding community northeast of San
Francisco observed: "We have been working from a policy that development pays its own way, regardless. While that is a noble goal and
something we should aim for, we are pricing ourselves into a situation
12 2
where we will get nothing."
Competition, however, does not effectively constrain local exaction policies when a developer or landowner's holdings predate the
exactions policy; in these cases, cost-effective or easy exit is impossible
because real estate is an immobile asset. 123 Similarly, municipalities
gain a monopolistic advantage to levy "market-distorting exactions"
where a particular parcel is unusually valuable due to its proximity to
117
Compare Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON.
416, 419 (1956) ("Consumer-voters are fully mobile and will move to that community
where their preference patterns, which are set, are best satisfied."), with HiRSCHMAN, supra
note 108, at 82-83 ("[Loyalty] is helpful also because it implies the possibility of disloyalty,
that is, exit.... In the absence of feelings of loyalty, exit per se is essentially costless ... .
118 See Tiebout, supra note 117, at 419-20.
119

120

See id.

See Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constrainton Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 473, 509-14 (1991).
121
See Carlson & Pollak, supra note 79, at 122-23.
122 Id. at 123. Here the city could have legally raised impact fees four or five times the
current levels, but instead decided on a modest average increase of approximately $1,100
per residential unit and $1.43 per square foot of commercial new construction. See id.
123
See Been, supra note 120, at 539. Furthermore, a community's reputation for high
exactions could conceivably depress property values or make property less marketable due
to potential buyers' fears of higher development costs. See id. at 521.
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transportation and other infrastructure. 2 4 Interjurisdictional competition also fails as a structural policing mechanism if the developer can
pass on the full cost of the exaction to the homebuyer or to the selling
landowner. 125 Also, antigrowth or exclusionary jurisdictions may simply not wish to discourage exit-and encourage loyalty-via reasonable exaction policies. 12 6 Conversely, older and built-out communities
are highly sensitive to interjurisdictional competition given their precarious finances, and are forced to turn to exactions in providing the
127
infrastructure and amenities the current tax base cannot afford.
III
IMPORTING THE TEST OF INTRINSIC FAIRNESS

Municipalities, property owners, developers, and land use attorneys are in need of a new test for adjudicating contested development
exactions. Neither the formal nor the functional approach used to
differentiate legislative and adjudicative exactions provides solid guidance in selecting a proper standard of review.' 28 Even if judges
could consistently identify legislative exactions, structural concerns
with the representative capacity of local governments counsel against
deference. 129 Scholars have also observed that the Nollan/Dolan doctrine of "essential nexus" and "rough proportionality" is simultaneously under- 13 0 and over-regulatory. 31 Criticism of the Supreme
124
See Sterk, Competition, supra note 115, at 859-60. But see Carlson & Pollak, supra
note 79, at 121 (giving the example of a mall developer who successfully resisted a city's
attempted dedication of three acres for building a new on-ramp to the adjacent freeway).
125
See Been, supra note 120, at 540-42. The scenario assumes two things: (1) the community is uniquely attractive and a price increase will not induce the homebuyer to look
elsewhere, and (2) no uses for the land are exaction-free and would potentially attract a
better offer from a developer with a different use in mind. See id.
126 See Sterk, Competition, supra note 115, at 842-44; see also Been, supra note 120, at
510, 513-14 ("States unwilling to lose a project to other states may strong-arm towns that
balk at accepting a developer's terms or may impose limits upon local governments' abilities to block development or levy exactions.").
127
See Carlson & Pollak, supra note 79, at 107, 120-22.
128
See supra Part I. Compare Inna Reznik, Note, The Distinction Between Legislative and
Adjudicative Decisions in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 242, 252-54 (2000)
(counting as many courts applying Dolan's doctrine of rough proportionality to scheduled
exactions as not applying it), with Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Non-Impact of the United States
Supreme Court Regulatory Takings Cases on the State Courts: Does the Supreme Court Really Matter?,
6 FORDHAM ENVrL. L.J. 523, 555 (1995) (contending that state courts reference Supreme
Court cases perfunctorily because they are unwilling to restrain state and local land use
and environmental regulation).
129
See supra Part II.
130
Underregulation occurs when a municipality decides against imposing an exaction
or imposes a smaller exaction than is permissible because it is concerned with the expense
of findings or of future litigation and liability. See Fenster, supra note 17, at 654-55.
131
Overregulation occurs when a municipality denies a development proposal because it seeks to avoid the risk of litigating over a conditioned permit approval. See Lee
Anne Fennell, Hard Bargains and Real Steals: Land Use Exactions Revisited, 86 IowA L. REv. 1,
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Court's approach to regulatory takings both for its "ad hocery" 3 2 and
its formalism 133 abounds.
Although fraught with constitutional questions and other dissatisfactions, under the best of circumstances exactions nurture a community's sense of place, that is, a local identity rooted in the unique
political and psychological panorama of an identifiable geographic
area. 1 34 Just as the antifederalist vision of a country replete with selfdefining communities obviates the need for an overly broad congressional mandate, "a view which suggests that a well-cultivated sense of
place is an important dimension of human well-being" 135 would commend minimizing judicial power (a foreign element to the community) when courts examine the constitutionality of development
exactions. Furthermore,
one may discover [while reading a landscape] an implicit ideology
that the individuality of places is a fundamental characteristic of
subtle and immense importance to life on earth, that all human
events take place, all problems are anchored in place, and ultimately
can only be understood in such terms. Such a view insists that our
individual lives are necessarily affected in myriad ways by the particular localities in which we live, that it is simply inconceivable that
13 6
anyone could be the same person in a different place.
Given the intersection of the particularity of place and the cry of "Unfair!" at the core of every contested development exaction, courts
should examine the issue of fairness within a specific situation and
territorial setting rather than applying abstract constitutional stan4-5 (2000) (finding irony in the contrast between the sweeping regulatory powers of local
government and the tight restrictions on regulatory bargaining); Fenster, supra note 17, at
661-65 (positing that the nexus requirement bars creative agreements that would substitute less costly and mutually acceptable-albeit unrelated-mitigation of development impacts). But see Fred P. Bosselman, Dolan Works, in TAKING SIDES ON TAKINGS ISSUES: PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE PERSPECTIVES

345, 345, 351-52 (Thomas E. Roberts ed., 2002) (arguing rough

proportionality is effective because developers accept that development should pay its own
way and much state legislation now specifies constitutionally valid methodologies for calculating exactions).
132
See, e.g., John E. Fee, The Takings Clause as a Comparative Right, 76 S. CAL. L. REv.
1003, 1006-07 (2003).
133
See, e.g., Fenster, supra note 17, at 611.
134
Cf Been, supra note 120, at 482-83 (offering reasons for exactions beyond the
obvious goal of local government to shift traditionally public costs to the private sector:
braking, facilitating, or accelerating growth; redistributing part of the developer's profit; or
preventing the development of affordable housing). See generally BUNNELL, supra note 112,
at 23-24, 33-35, 42 (proposing that Americans bridge their ideological differences
through their common yearning for special places that reflect familiar values, exhibit
drama and dignity, offer variety and whimsy, and provide spaces to gather and things to
do).
135

D.W. Meinig, The BeholdingEye: Ten Versions of the Same Scene, in THE INTERPRETATION
33, 46 (D.W. Meinig ed., 1979).

OF ORDINARY LANDSCAPES: GEOGRAPHICAL ESSAYS
136

Id.
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dards. 137 Accordingly, this Note imports the test of intrinsic fairness
from corporate law, modifies it, and proposes its application to all
contested exactions. 138 The consideration of relative equity has
flowed as a distinct subcurrent through the past eleven years' jurisprudence regarding contested development exactions-and the test of
139
intrinsic fairness brings this fundamental concern to the surface.
The Delaware Court of Chancery formulated the test of intrinsic
fairness in Levien v. Sinclair Oil Corporation,in which a minority stockholder alleged that the parent corporation treated its subsidiary unfairly by forcing it to pay dividends and by stifling its growth. 140 Upon
review, the Delaware Supreme Court did not apply the test, but did
note that the test could be appropriately applied in other situations.' 4 ' Section A offers theoretical and practical considerations for
the cross-fertilization from business organizations to land use planning, including a summary of the test of intrinsic fairness. Section B
modifies the test for contested development exactions.
A.

Practical and Theoretical Considerations

Several theoretical justifications for importing the test of intrinsic
fairness from business organizations to land use planning suggest
themselves. Most fundamentally, the modem metropolis and its more
137 Cf. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 858 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc)
(Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) ("The Founding Fathers did not establish the United States as a
democratic republic so that elected officials would decide trivia, while all great questions
would be decided by the judiciary."), rev'd sub nor. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702
(1997).
138
Cf Laurie Reynolds, Rethinking Municipal Annexation Powers, 24 U"t. LAw. 247, 251
(1992) (arguing for an objective test, comparable to the test of intrinsic fairness, for passing on the legality of municipal annexations). Annexation is a good counterpoint to development exactions because, in tapping private economic growth for municipal benefit, this
growth strategy of local government may similarly infringe on individual property rights.
139 See, e.g., Spinell Homes, Inc. v. Municipality of Anchorage, 78 P.3d 692, 703 (Alaska
2003) (finding that a developer who was mandated to plant one or two trees on each lot
did not "suffer[ ] an impact of the kind or magnitude" that would necessitate NollaniDolan
analysis); KMST, LLC v. County of Ada, 67 P.3d 56, 61-62 (Idaho 2003) (holding there was
no taking where a developer voluntarily agreed to a public road dedication in order to
speed project approval); Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. P'ship, 135
S.W.3d 620, 644-45 (Tex. 2004) (striking a municipal requirement that a developer tear
up a two-lane asphalt road, still in good repair, and replace it with a two-lane concrete
surface); Grogan v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 221 A.D.2d 441, 442 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995)
(validating a scenic-and-conservation easement that barred development on part of plaintiff's property but did not grant public access to it);J.C. Reeves Corp. v. Clackamas County,
887 P.2d 360, 365 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that a developer was required to eliminate
a proposed "spite strip" that would impair legal access to an adjacent property, and instead
construct a road abutting the new subdivision's boundary).
140
See261 A.2d911,916-17,918-919 (Del. Ch. 1969), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,280
A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
141
See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 721-22 (Del. 1971) (determining
that the business judgment standard applies when no disproportionate treatment of minority shareholders has occurred).
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comic or perhaps tragic forms, such as edge cities, chicken farming
megaplants, networked rural townships, and festival marketplaces, are
the physical manifestations of surplus corporate capital. 142 Second,
local governments increasingly view their rezoning and long-term
comprehensive planning as a form of business strategy, often favoring
solutions that promise to eliminate vacant or underperforming
properties to ensure a community's future solvency.1 43 Likewise, if exiting a jurisdiction is an option for residents or businesses, then municipal as well as private corporations represent voluntary
arrangements that bind one set of parties to another party's
actions. 144
Third, the expanding concept of corporate fiduciary obligationwithin which the test of intrinsic fairness is rooted-is a desirable
model for local government behavior. Paradigmatic fiduciaries, including agent-principal, director-corporation, and guardian-ward,

142
See DAVID HARVEY, JUSTICE, NATURE AND THE GEOGRAPHY OF DIFFERENCE 295-99
(1996); see alsoJAMES HOWARD KUNSTLER, THE CITY IN MIND: MEDITATIONS ON THE URBAN
CONDITION 41-75 (2001) ("In Atlanta's case ... the whole overblown metropolitan area,
including downtown, had become a galaxy of Edge City projects tied together by the freeways and the gruesome multilane 'collector' streets.... The definitive statement was left to
an ambitious Atlanta architect-turned-developer named John Portman who, during the
'go-go' years of urban renewal, designed a particular new kind of heroically grandiose antiurban hotel that became the darling of bigtime commercial developers and visionary municipal planning officials all over the nation."). CompareJONATHAN BARNETr, REDESIGNING
CITIES: PRINCIPLES, PRACTICE, IMPLEMENTATION 32 (2003) ("Le Corbusier speculated [in the
1930s] that 'sooner or later' his ideas for Manhattan will be carried out by corporations,
'the land-owning syndicates,' or 'strong, well-directed legislative measures.'"), with Charles
V. Bagli, US.Jury Limits Payout of Trade Center'sBiggest Insurer,N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2004, at BI
(opining that the redevelopment of Ground Zero exemplifies public desires and government needs as steered by the financial and organizational capacity of a single economic
dominant).
143
See BARNETT, supra note 142, at 153-55; see, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S.
374, 401-02 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (equating exactions that arise from commercial development with business regulations). See generally Fred P. Bosselman, Land as a
Privileged Form of Property, in TAKINGS: LAND-DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS AND REGULATORY
TAKINGS AFTER Dolan and Lucas 29 (David L. Callies ed., 1996) (arguing that recent Supreme Court decisions ignore the reality that "interests in land have become more like
securities and often resemble other forms of investment capital"); Eduardo Moisos
Pefialver, Is Land Special? The Unjustified Preferencefor Landownership in Regulatory Takings
Law, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 227 (2004) (critiquing the jurisprudential distinction between real
and personal property).
144
Cf Stewart E. Sterk, Minority Protection in Residential Private Governments, 77 B.U. L.
REv. 273, 306-07 (1997) (stating that corporate law provides background principles to
assess governance problems in common interest groups such as residential community associations). But see FISCHEL, supra note 89, at 271 (noting that dissatisfied individuals can
leave a community despite owning immobile assets, but they cannot leave the universe of
rule by local government altogether). See generally id. at 267-69 (comparing municipal and
private corporations).
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must exercise their legally recognized discretion on their beneficiary's
behalf.' 4 5 That said,
It]he scope of the fiduciary's obligation, as well as the obligation's
precise formulation, necessarily varies with the context of the
relationship.
... Many courts are obviously willing to consider applying fiduciary
obligation in situations beyond the conventional categories, including, in recent years, commercial franchises, distributorship relationships, a bank's relationship with its borrowers and its depositors,
and the relationship between holders of executive and nonexecutive interests in oil and gas estates ....
[C]ourts impose fiduciary
constraints whenever one person's discretion ought to be controlled because of characteristics of that person's relationship with
46
another.1
A public planner or municipal executive logically holds a type of fiduciary obligation towards the permit-seeking developer or landowner
because the local government is "entrusted" with the property (in the
form of its use interest) for the duration of the permitting process. In
occupying both sides of the transaction, a bureaucrat may not act
purely in the best interest of her principal, the municipality. 14 7 The
presence of self-interest as a determinative factor in the final decision
on a development application erodes the protection of the business
judgment rule, and obligates judges to thoroughly analyze the con148
tested transaction.
Situations calling for the test of intrinsic fairness thus exhibit
three characteristics: fiduciary duty by the more powerful party, selfdealing by that party, and exclusion of (or detriment to) the other
party.' 49 "[S]ubject to careful judicial scrutiny," a defendant carries
the burden to prove that its transactions with the weaker party were
objectively fair. 150 For the test to apply, a plaintiff need not prove it
was entitled to the tangible or intangible asset that was transferred or

withheld.

15

1

In analyzing a contested transaction under the test of intrinsic
fairness, a court inquires whether the transaction were (1) undertaken
145
See Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988
DuKE L.J. 879, 908.
146
Id. at 908-10 (footnotes omitted).

See id. at 912.
See, e.g., Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1168 (Del. 1995).
149
See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971); see also Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Summa Corp., 374 A.2d 5, 13 (Del. Ch. 1977) (collapsing second and third
requirements). See generally Lawrence E. Mitchell, Fairness and Trust in CorporateLaw, 43
DuKE L.J. 425, 436-44 (1993) (reviewing case law).
150
Sinclair Oi 280 A.2d at 720.
151
See Burton v. Exxon Corp., 583 F. Supp. 405, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
147
148
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through a fair process, and (2) concluded with a fair price. 15 2 The
fair-process analysis asks how the parties reached the terms of the
transaction. 53 The fair-price analysis examines the substantive terms
of the transaction and demands proof they fall within a range that
would have been acceptable to unrelated parties.' 54 Taken together,
the two inquiries constitute the test of intrinsic fairness. In sum, a fair
bargaining process should ensure fair price, even where a powerful
t 55
fiduciary gratifies its financial interests in a weaker corporation.
The test of intrinsic fairness is therefore more than a commentary on
fiduciary duty, but rather contemplates that all parties to a transaction
conform their behavior to a concept of social responsibility and inter156
nalize a sense of balance and proportion.
B.

Modification for Contested Development Exactions

The first part of the test of intrinsic fairness as modified for contested development exactions revolves around fair process and incorporates a concern with voice and exit.1 57 A judge may inquire: Did
the applicant-beneficiary suspect that a permit would have been conditioned by an exaction of this kind? If so, the court might find that
instead of litigating, the developer should have protected her interests
by exit, or perhaps by timely voice. The community's patterns of
change and accommodation towards its comprehensive plan give an
indication of predictability, as do the accessibility and transparency of
its planning processes to the public.
152
See Sandra K. Miller, The Role of the Court in Balancing Contractual Freedom with the
Need for Mandatory Constraintson Opportunisticand Abusive Conduct in the LLC, 152 U. PA. L.
REv. 1609, 1642 (2004).
153
See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-07 (1939) ("The essence of the test is
whether or not under all the circumstances the transaction carries the earmarks of an
arm's length bargain."); Cinerama,663 A.2d at 1162 ("[Fair dealing] embraces questions of
when the transaction was timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to
the directors, and how the approvals of the directors and the stockholders were obtained."
(quoting Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983))); Levien v. Sinclair Oil
Corp., 261 A.2d 911, 919 (Del. Ch. 1969) (understanding the idea of fair dealing as prohibiting majority shareholders' "use [of] power to gain undue advantage.., at the expense of
the minority [shareholders]" (quoting Case v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 204 N.E.2d 643, 646
(N.Y. 1965))).
154
See, e.g., Shlensky v. S. Parkway Bldg. Corp., 166 N.E.2d 793, 801-02 (Ill. 1960)
(stating that fairness includes considerations such as "whether the transaction was at the
market price, or below, or constituted a better bargain than the corporation could have
otherwise obtained in dealings with others"); cf Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co.,
254 U.S. 590, 601-602 (1921) ("[S]ale 'under the hammer' is synonymous with a sale at a
sacrifice, and prices obtained at such sales have usually been rejected by courts when tendered as evidence of value.").
155
See Cinerama, 663 A.2d at 1163; see also Shlensky, 166 N.E.2d at 801-02 (remarking
that the concept of entire fairness eludes precise definition, despite availability of several
indicators).
156
See Mitchell, supra note 149, at 426.
157
See supra notes 108-27 and accompanying text.
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Normalcy, as a behavioral standard, strongly relates to predictability: If a municipal fiduciary imposes exactions that are not "normal," the permit conditions are neither predictable nor
commensurate with the social responsibility of the transacting parties.
Normalcy may be described as the "kinds of regulations people would
willingly impose on themselves if they were outsiders to their own
community."'15 8 The application of a broad, normalcy-based standard,
however, is likely to grant more insight into a judge's personal sense
of decency than into the total fairness of a contested exaction. The
more appropriate inquiry narrows the focus to whether the proposed
activity is consistent with recognizable standards, that is, the extent to
which the regulations underlying the exactions are compatible with
the physical qualities and public usage of the area's built and unbuilt
environment. 1 59 Because inquiry into normalcy creates the quagmire
of demarcating community sentiment from actual community standards (a problem that is particularly acute in times of social or economic flux), 160 courts should evaluate characteristics of normalcy
concurrently with indicators of predictability.
By promoting the opposite of the arms-length dealing glorified in
the corporate context, voice functions as an important component of
fair process when applied to contested development exactions. Here
the inquiry illuminates whether the applicant had the chance either
to shape the political context giving rise to the permit condition or to
participate meaningfully in the bargaining process. 16 ' Against the infinite permutations of voice, a court must decide as a threshold matter
whether the applicant is a community resident or is aligned with a
coalition of insiders. In either case, the court may conclude that the
supra note 89, at 62.
See generally DONLYN LYNDON & CHARLES W. MooRE, CHAMBERS FOR A MEMORY PAL.
ACE (1994) (providing a personal set of observations on the composition of places, including the elements of paths, walls, light and shadow, gardens, and memory); DAVID SUCHER,
CITY COMFORTS: How TO BUILD AN URBAN VILLAGE 15 (1995) ("The comfortable city and
the urban village are both built and experienced as a series of details, which may appear
seamless and coherent, if things work well, but in fact were created over a lengthy period of
time and by a variety of minds.").
160
Cf J. David Breemer & R. S. Radford, The (Less?) Murky Doctrine of Investment-Backed
Expectations After Palazzolo, and the Lower Courts' DisturbingInsistence on Wallowing in the PrePalazzolo Muck, 34 Sw. U. L. REv. 351, 417-25 (2005) (explaining how "rational irrationality" molds community expectations for the development of private land); R.S. Radford,
Land Use Regulation and Legal Rhetoric: Broadening the Terms of Debate, 21 FoRDHAM URB. L.J.
413, 419-23 (1994) (reviewing DENNISJ. COYLE, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE CONSTITUTION:
SHAPING SOCIETY THROUGH LAND USE REGULATION (1993)) (questioning the authenticity of
land use preferences articulated in terms of costless decisions regarding the use of others'
property).
161
Cf Erin Ryan, Student Article, Zoning, Taking, and Dealing: The Problems and Promise
of Bargaining in Land Use Planning Conflicts, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 337, 347-59 (2002)
(discussing how land use planning practice historically has relied upon the negotiations
process).
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applicant was able to influence local elections or appointments. Additional considerations as to the applicant's bargaining strength include
whether her economic clout materially affected the negotiations and
whether the municipality could have made a better bargain with a
more equally matched partner under otherwise identical circumstances. To obtain relief, the dissatisfied applicant must plead the unfair nature of the contested exaction with specificity, and indeed the
multifactor approach of the intrinsic fairness test ensures detailed
pleadings.
Along with evaluating opportunities for voice, the reviewing court
must determine whether the applicant had opportunity to exit the
transaction or the community around the time the municipality imposed the exaction. If she did not, and reasonably chose to litigate,
the court should be receptive to her complaint. To weigh the opportunity for exit, a court should consider: whether the applicant owned
her property or held an option on it, whether the parcel were unique
or ordinary, 162 whether the applicant could have relocated the proposed project to another municipality given her finances and expertise and current market trends, and finally, whether the municipal
fiduciaries misled the applicant about the likelihood of a permit condition or its likely scope, thereby obscuring the need for exit.
In examining the totality of a negotiated permitting process, a
reviewing court's understanding of exit must embrace the range of
options available to the exacting jurisdiction at the time it offered the
conditioned approval. 16 3 A municipality that concluded it had no
choice but to impose a comprehensive program of exactions would
leave a dissatisfied applicant no course of action other than exit. The
gravamen of an applicant's complaint in this situation might be the
following: The municipality did not impose the permit condition to
mitigate any specific burden the proposed development would impose
on the community, but instead hoped to place on an outsider the
burden to resolve preexisting local problems. Under the test of intrinsic fairness, a developer could allege nonfrivolously that the jurisdiction turned to exactions as a politically easier revenue source than
taxes, adopted an antigrowth stance leading to a policy of substantial
exactions regardless of the contours of a particular proposal, knowingly raised exactions excessively yet competitively below those of its
antigrowth neighbors, or, upon reaching build-out, decided to lay the
162
But cf Van Wagner Adver. Corp. v. S & M Enters., 492 N.E.2d 756, 759 (N.Y. 1986)
(holding that because each parcel is unique in some way, uniqueness in and of itself does
not mandate equitable relief).
163
Cf Levien v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 261 A.2d 911, 920 (Del. Ch. 1969) (assessing the
sufficiency of a subsidiary's complaint, namely, that its parent company forced it to pay
dividends because the parent needed cash, required the court to examine the parent's
motives in light of its alternatives).
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bulk of its unmet infrastructure needs on the "last developer in
line."

16 4

Newspaper articles, comparative studies, and a community's past
impact reviews of other proposed developments may substantiate such
allegations. The primary objection to this further dimension is that it
undermines legitimate municipal choices-an objection that rests
upon the problematic assumption that local government is capable of
representing both majority and minority interests. 165 The deeper
philosophical issue concerns whether courts operate within a world of
permit conditions that strictly mitigate only those externalities generated by the instant project (thereby implementing a community's vision for itself piece-by-piece) or within a world of permit conditions
that loosely refract a general land use policy for the jurisdiction. The
Supreme Court has espoused the former view through the Nollan/DoIan doctrine, 166 and the proposed test of intrinsic fairness promotes
an open-ended and nonpartisan review consistent with that
jurisprudence.
Complementing judicial inquiry into fair process, the second half
of the modified test of intrinsic fairness comprises the concept of fair
price. This requirement constrains redistribution by ensuring that a
local government does not compel a developer to pay more in exactions than the cost of ameliorating the short- or long-term harm to the
community caused by her project. The corporate standard, based on
the acquisition of goods and services, is inapposite; 167 rough proportionality substitutes for it.
A reviewing court should place on one side of the equation the
scope of certain public harm, rather than the value the public could
have theoretically exacted from the project through permit conditions. The other side of the equation consists of the dedication value
or the cash payment demanded from the applicant, plus her imminent debit in the form of other development costs that would escalate
were the municipality to impose the exaction. 168 Ensuring an accurate calculation of proportionality, a court measures the applicant's
loss-not what the applicant would gain from permission to complete
164
See Carlson & Pollak, supra note 79, at 120-22. Ailing inner cities and older suburbs paradoxically make strong cases for standards of normalcy that favor certain settlement patterns and thus indirectly support certain kinds of exactions.
165
See supra notes 91-98 and accompanying text.
166 See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
167
See Mitchell, supra note 149, at 446.
168
See McDermott, Exactions, supra note 60, at 68 ("Exactions add both direct and indirect costs ....
Direct costs include those costs associated with design and engineering,
hard construction, direct cash payments, operating, and plan review. Indirect costs may
include lost project yield and interest-carrying charges incurred in review and delay of
approval.").
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her project unobstructed. 169 Moreover, an emphasis on proportionality to the disregard of essential nexus keeps both the regulators and
the courts honest. 70 Under the test of intrinsic fairness, a court may
not take an impact into account as a harm solely because it transgresses a regulation or fails to follow constitutional doctrine, but
rather when it negatively affects the community in a serious and mea7
surable way. ' '

Harm and loss are relative and subjective occurrences. As such, a
fatal circularity arises when the same entity establishing the relative
weight of these negativities (be it a municipality or a reviewing court)
also determines their rough proportionality by setting exaction levels
or by passing on their fairness. Insights from corporate law on the
intertwined nature of fair price and fair process provide escape from
the conundrum; a jurisprudence that utilizes the standards of normalcy to measure harm to the community and loss to the developer
performs similarly. As importantly, the approach presents a sensible
way to grapple with municipal diversity and the simultaneous fertility
and futility of localness

1
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CONCLUSION

Over ten years ago, the Supreme Court formulated a position on
contested development exactions in the form of the Nollan/Dolandoctrine. State courts, municipalities, and developers still struggle to define the contours of the doctrine: Does it apply exclusively to
dedications of land (and possibly to easements) or to monetary fees as
well? Does it apply to exactions that are scheduled within an ordinance (regardless how poorly reasoned) or only to negotiated permit
conditions? To the extent that certain judicial trends have emerged
nationwide, this Note has shown they reflect the allure of bright-line
rules rather than represent a thoughtful response to the structure of
local decision making. The test of intrinsic fairness, guided by the
ideals of fair price and fair process, seeks to harness the vitality of local
169

But cf Andrew W. Schwartz, Reciprocity of Advantage: The Antidote to the Antidemocratic

Trend in Regulatory Takings, 22 UCLAJ. ENvrL. L. & Po'v 1, 68-76 (2003/04) (discussing

the theory of average reciprocity of advantage, which contends that reductions in property
values caused by regulatory takings are offset by increases in property values caused by
regulatory givings).
170
See generally FISCHEL, supra note 89, at 349 (fallacy of essential nexus); Fenster, supra
note 17, at 663-64 (same).
171
Cf Durand v. IDC Bellingham, LLC, 793 N.E.2d 359, 363-64 (Mass. 2003) (abandoning the state's reasonable relationship test to uphold legality of a "voluntary offer of
public benefits beyond what might be necessary to mitigate the development").
172
Cf KENNETH KOLSON, BIG PLANS: THE ALLURE AND FOLLY OF URBAN DESIGN (2001)
(claiming that large-scale urban plans tend to overstate the role of rationality in public
life). No facile right-left divide characterizes the issues; pro-growth policies affect the property rights of established owners as much as anti-growth policies do.
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government while acknowledging its capacity to stifle minority and
unpopular interests.
The regulatory takings issues that development exactions raise
are neither esoteric nor constitutionally rarified. The process and
substance of these permit conditions affect the layout of our homes
and yards, where we shop and where we go to school, how we commute and how we cleanse our sewage-in other words, the sum quality of our interactions with the built and unbuilt environment around
us. Highly localized exactions become the stuff of our day-to-day and
emotional lives.1 73 By influencing our commitment as citizens "to particular visions of the good life, specific cultural heritages, or understandings of justice or morality," they support "the continuing efforts
to create, maintain, change, and challenge a collective identity
[which] surely are a legitimate and common subject of democratic
politics.

1 74

For these reasons, the test of intrinsic fairness looks to

safeguard the legitimate interests of both individual property owners
and developers as well as other community residents. The virtues of
local democracy may best be served by institutional constraints that
prevent process failures from undermining the fundamental fairness
owed to all its constituents.
In the center of Fedora, that gray stone metropolis, stands a metal building with a crystal globe in every room. Looking into each globe, you see a
blue city, the model of a different Fedora. These are the forms the city could
have taken if,
for one reason or another,it had not become what we see today
In every age someone, looking at Fedora as it was, imagined a way of making
it the ideal city, but while he constructed his miniature model, Fedora was
already no longer the same as before, and what had been until yesterday a
possible future became only a toy in a glass globe.
... On the map of your empire, 0 Great Khan, there must be room both
for the big, stone Fedora and the little Fedoras in glass globes. Not because
they are all equally real, but because all are only assumptions. The one
contains what is accepted as necessary when it is not yet so; the others, what
is imagined as possible and, a moment later, is possible no longer.
175
-Italo Calvino
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See David M. Hummon, Community Attachment: Local Sentiment and Sense of Place, in
253, 260-62 (Irwin Altman & Setha M. Low eds., 1992).
supra note 80, at 795-96.
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